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Of TEAs and Takings:
Compensation Guarantees for Confiscated
Tradeable Environmental Allowances
Henry A. Span
Over the last twenty years, the prospect of using market mechanisms
and property-rights concepts to manage environmental resources has
drawn increasing attention within the environmental literature' and from
policymakers One predominant method of using the power of market
1. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRIcES (1968); Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives.
13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental
Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1495 (1999); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins. Incentive-
Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?. 18 ECOLOGY LQ. 1 (1991);
Colloquy, Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463
(1991) [hereinafter Providing Economic Incentives]; Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L REV.
129 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, The Several Futures of Property]; Norman W. Spaulding Ill. Note,
Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalisnz and the Promise of Market Incentives,
16 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 293 (1997). Writing nearly a decade ago. Carol Rose observed that the
"pollution rights approach has now become quite d la mode, and it plays an increasing role in our
environmental law." Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Enivironmnental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE LJ. 1, 27. A quick review of the literature and of current
legislation shows that, if anything, this is even more true today.
2. See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990, tit. IV, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994)
(creating the sulfur dioxide (SO,) emissions trading program, which utilizes tradeable annual
allowances, each of which permits the discharge of one ton of sulfur dioxide); 50 C.F.R. § 652.20
(1994) (creating an individual transferable quota (ITQ) scheme for the management of the
Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries); Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General
Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076
(1982) (describing the Emissions Trading Policy, which allows trading of the emission reduction
credits (ERCs) granted to firms that reduce their emissions below specified levels); TAHOE REG'L
PLANNING AGENCY, CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 20.3C & 34 (1987) (granting property owners
transferable development rights (TDRs) that may be sold to owners of parcels eligible for
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forces to achieve environmental goals, such as limiting air and water
pollution, involves the issuance of tradeable environmental allowances
(TEAs).3 A TEA is a permit to perform a certain quantifiable activity over
a period of time-for example, to emit a ton of sulfur dioxide over the
course of a year. Since a TEA can be traded, it will flow to its most efficient
user, and environmental goals will be achieved at substantial cost savings.
The issue that this Note examines is whether the government should
constitutionally guarantee TEA-holders compensation when, because of
changed conditions or changed policy goals, the government decides to
confiscate or otherwise limit the rights conferred by TEAs. It is the thesis of
this Note that while there are some policy reasons for guaranteeing
compensation, public choice theory suggests that guarantees will lead to
overprotection of TEA-holder interests more often than they will prevent
underprotection. This is because in most TEA settings, the regulatees will
enjoy organizational advantages that enable them to protect themselves
politically from unexpected regulatory jolts such as confiscation without
compensation.
The actions authorized by TEAs usually can be categorized as (1)
putting something into the commons (emissions) or (2) taking something
out of the commons (extractions). Examples of the former include ai? and
water5 pollution, while commercial fishing6 is the predominant example of
construction). For an analysis of four tradeable-environmental-allowance programs, see Robert
W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 791 (1999) (using the phrase "tradeable environmental
allowances").
4. The literature on TEA programs is vast, especially in the areas of air pollution and fishing.
The following is only a small sampling from the TEA air-pollution literature. Besides the works
cited supra note 1, see David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? The Emissions Trading Idea
and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1998); Robert W. Hahn &
Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory
Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1983); Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An International Market
for Transferable Gas Emission Permits To Promote Climate Change, 9 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J.
261 (1998); and Carlos A. Gavilondo, Comment, Trading Clean Air-The 1990 Acid Rain Rules:
How 7hey Will Work and Initial Responses to the Market System, 67 TUL. L. REv. 749 (1993).
5. See, e.g., Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a
Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137 (1998); Kurt Stephenson ct al.,
Toward an Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance Trading System: Identifying the
Statutory and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 ENvTL. LAW. 775 (1999); William E.
Taylor & Mark Gerath, The Watershed Protection Approach: Is the Promise About To Be
Realized?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1996, at 16, 20 (describing several water-pollution
trading schemes).
6. See, e.g., RIGHTS BASED FISHING (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989); Alison Rieser,
Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393 (1999) [hereinafter Rieser, Prescriptions]; Alison Rieser, Property
Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?. 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 813 (1997) [hereinafter Rieser, Property Rights]; Franz Thomas Litz, Comment,
Harnessing Market Forces in Natural Resources Management: Lessons from the Surf Clam
Fishery, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 335 (1994); Carrie A. Tipton, Note. Protecting
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the latter. A third, less easily characterized category includes TEA
programs designed to regulate land development for historic preservation,7
protection of wetlands,8 protection of habitats,9 or general local land-use
management." Without the requisite allowances, one is prohibited from
emitting, extracting, or developing.
The rationale behind the implementation of TEA programs is to place
the incentives created by property rights and markets at the disposal of
environmental conservation. While any permit- or license-based system can
place limits on activity levels simply by capping the total number of permits
that will be issued, TEA programs promote the efficient use of permits by
making them tradeable. Those for whom the TEAs are more valuable will
purchase them from those who value them less." For example, those who
can most efficiently cut their pollution levels will sell their excess
allowances to those for whom emissions reduction is more costly, while
those who can most profitably fish will buy allowances from less profitable
operations. The overall target is met, whether it be a certain amount of
sulfur dioxide emitted or sea clams harvested, at a substantial cost savings.
In the emissions context, TEA programs also create incentives to develop
pollution-abatement technologies because the less pollution one emits, the
fewer allowances one has to buy (and, conversely, the more allowances one
can sell).12
An important issue that has been raised by the proliferation of TEA
programs is the property status of TEAs. One question in particular that has
received attention is whether or not the government is constitutionally
required to provide compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual Transferable Quotas To
Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 381 (1995).
7. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding a historic
preservation program utilizing transferable development rights (TDRs)).
8. See, e.g., Kathrin Ellen Yates, Comment, Wetlands Mitigation and Mitigation Banking in
Louisiana, 59 LA. L. REV. 591 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Todd G. Olson et al., The Habitat Transaction Method: A Proposal for Creating
Tradable Credits in Endangered Species Habitat, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 27 (Wendy E. Hudson ed., 1994); John F. Turner & Jason C.
Rylander, Conserving Endangered Species on Private Lands, 32 LAND & WATER L REV. 571
(1997); David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the
Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
405 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners
of Developed and Undeveloped Property, 40 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1997); Andrew J. Miller,
Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed To
Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOuRCES J. 459 (1999).
11. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 179; Rose, The Several Futures of Property.
supra note 1, at 165.
12. See Justin Savage, Note, Confiscation of Emission Reduction Credits: Te Case for
Compensation Under the Takings Clause, 16 VA. ENvI_ LJ. 227. 238 (1997).
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Amendment 3 if it confiscates or in other ways adversely alters the rights
granted by TEAs. The approach typically taken to the compensation
question is to decide first whether TEAs count as property for the purposes
of the Takings Clause, and then, if they do, to apply takings doctrine in an
effort to determine whether their confiscation or alteration counts as a
mandatorily compensable "taking." 4
This doctrinal focus is misguided. Even ardent proponents of
compensation admit that whether TEAs count as property for purposes of
the Takings Clause depends on the language the government uses when it
creates TEA programs. 5 If this is true, then the important question is not
whether the government is constitutionally bound to provide compensation,
but whether the government should constitutionally bind itself to provide
compensation. 6 This is a policy issue that depends on considerations of
efficiency, fairness, and political pragmatism.
The primary issue regarding constitutionally guaranteeing
compensation is whether so doing optimally structures the incentives faced
by private and public decisionmakers. Ultimately, this Note concludes that
the government can achieve substantially the same efficiency results
through assurances and consistent regulatory practice, and that in most TEA
contexts, ex ante constitutional guarantees are unlikely to improve
government decisionmaking. This is because, as mentioned earlier, TEA-
holders are likely to enjoy considerable organizational advantages that
make it unlikely that alterations in programs that are substantially adverse
to their interests will occur without compensation, particularly if the overall
benefits of granting compensation outweigh the overall costs. This is
especially likely to be the case in the context of TEA programs that regulate
emissions and extractions. TEA-holders in those programs are generally
industrial polluters and commercial fishers, precisely the sort of business
groups that public choice theory suggests will have a disproportionate voice
in regulatory decisionmaking."7
An exception to the general organizational advantage of TEA-holders
might exist, however, in the context of the third type of TEA program,
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V (" [IN]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
14. Three examples that fit this doctrinal model are Susan A. Austin, Comment, Tradable
Emissions Programs: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26 ENvTL. L. 323 (1996); Yvonne
F. Lindgren, Note, The Emissions Trading Policy: Smoke on the Horizon for Takings Clause
Claimants, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 667 (1991); and Savage, supra note 12.
15. See Savage, supra note 12, at 246 (accepting that explicit statutory disclaimers prevent
TEAs from constituting property under the Fifth Amendment).
16. This would entail placing binding language in legislation creating TEAs; courts reading
such language would then require the government to provide compensation when it confiscated
TEAs.
17. For the now-classic explication of this phenomenon, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 141-48 (197 1).
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namely, those that regulate land development. Insofar as owners of
undeveloped land generally do not share the organizational advantages
enjoyed by industrial polluters and commercial fishers, it might be
appropriate to offer those governed by transferable developmental rights
(TDR) programs constitutional protection from uncompensated TEA
confiscations in certain contexts.
Part I provides background on the general nature and structure of TEA
programs and describes the ways in which governments might decide
to curtail TEAs, as well as their reasons for doing so. Part II discusses
the various policy considerations that are relevant to the decision whether
or not to guarantee compensation constitutionally. Part Iii focuses on the
impact of guaranteed compensation on public decisionmaking, ultimately
concluding that constitutionally guaranteed compensation is unnecessary in
most TEA contexts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Mechanics of TEA Programs
TEA programs operate by first setting an overall regulatory limit on use
of a resource and then allocating individual allowances to persons or
entities, who are free to buy, sell, lease, bank, or trade them." Each TEA
can represent either an absolute quantity (for example, one ton of pollution)
or a percentage of a total (for example, five percent of the annual total
allowable catch (TAG) of a given fish stock).' 9 As the examples suggest,
the former method is usually utilized in emissions-control programs,"0 while
the percentage method is usually utilized in extraction-control programs.2'
18. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 8-10.
19. See, for example, the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, which defines an -individual
fishing quota" as "a Federal permit... to harvest a quantity of fish, expressed by a unit or units
representing a percentage of the total allowable catch of a fishery. " 16 U.S.C. § I 802(21) (Supp.
IV 1998).
20. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 402(3). 42 U.S.C. § 765 la(3).
21. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1802(21); 50 C.F.R. §§ 652.20(b), 652.21 (1994). In the fishing
context, the allowances are generally referred to as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). although
different statutes use different terminology. See Rieser, Prescriptions, supra note 6. at 395 & n.7
(using the term "individual transferable quotas" and stating in the footnote that "[when these
[fishing] permits are tradeable or transferable ... the literature uses the term 'ITQ'").
Experience with the use of TEA programs has generally been good, although there have been
some disappointing results. They generally seem to have performed better with respect to
emissions than with respect to extractions. Among the former, the TEA programs designed to
reduce the amount of lead emitted in automobile exhaust, see Powers, supra note 5, at 162-63, and
sulfur dioxide emitted from factories, see Paul L. Joskow et al., The Market for Suffitr Dioxide
Emissions, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 669 (1998), have been very successful, although the program
designed to reduce smog in the Los Angeles basin has disappointed some, see Richard Toshiyuki
Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Erperiment in
Air Quality Policy, 9 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231,268-83 (1999).
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Similar in structure to programs that regulate emissions, transferable
development rights (TDR) programs set a limit on overall land development
in the region governed by the program and then allocate TDRs, defined as
absolute quantities, to individual landowners on the basis of that limit.22 But
unlike both emission and extraction programs, TDR programs usually
create different development zones within the overall TDR region, each of
which permits a different level of development regardless of the number of
TDRs that one holds.23 For example, particular parcels within the TDR
region might be zoned residential or marked for historic preservation.
As a result, fewer TDRs would be allowed to be applied to these parcels
than to those with less restrictive zoning. More drastically, parcels might
be designated as wetlands or as habitats for endangered species and all
development on them barred. In that case, although the owners of such
designated parcels would be granted the same number of TDRs per acre as
everyone else in the TDR program, they would not be able to apply them to
their own land. Their only recourse would be to sell their excess TDRs to
those who owned parcels in less restricted zones and who, without the
additional TDRs, could not develop their land to the maximum extent
allowed by law. 24 The idea is that receipts from the sale of TDRs will
compensate those who own restricted land, thereby avoiding the need to
The results in the extraction context have been more mixed. Compare Litz, supra note 6
(describing the positive results of an ITQ program regulating surf clam fishery), with Rieser.
Property Rights, supra note 6 (providing a general critique of the use of ITQ programs to regulate
commercial fishing). TEA systems work only if it is possible to set a sensible overall total and
then to monitor individual TEA-holders in order to make sure that they stay within their allocated
limits. In the fishing context, for example, the goal generally is to set the TAC in accordance with
the sustainable maximum yield or the sustainable economic yield, but recent studies suggest that
this quantity might fluctuate unpredictably. Unpredictable environmental factors, such as the
success of the targeted species' natural predators and prey, might alter how many fish optimally
can be caught. To the extent that this is true, regulators will not be able to set a sensible TAC that
can then be divided among fishers. See, e.g., Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic
View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND
ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 311 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987);
William K. Stevens, Biologists Fear Sustainable Yield Is Unsustainable Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 1993, at C4.
22. See, e.g., TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 20.3.C, 34
(1987).
23. See Miller, supra note 10, at 467. I am using the term "transferable development rights"
broadly, to include all TEA-type programs that regulate land development, not just those with the
send-receive structure described in the text. So, for example, I am including the "habitat
protection method," described by Todd Olson, as a TDR program even though Olson contrasts it
with TDR programs. Olson et al., supra note 9, at 34.
24. Whereas those in sending zones are given more TDRs than they are allowed to use on
their own land, those in receiving zones are granted fewer TDRs than are usable on their own
land. Hence, those in receiving zones need to purchase TDRs from those in sending zones in order
to develop their land to the maximum legal extent. See generally John J. Costonis, Development
Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973) (describing and defending the
theory and practice of TDR programs). As Costonis explains, "Development rights transfer breaks
the linkage between particular land and its development potential by permitting the transfer of that
potential ... to land where greater density will not be objectionable." Id. at 85-86.
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deplete the public treasury. Zones in which landowners are not able to use
all of their TDRs on their own land are generally referred to as "sending"
zones, while those in zones in which landowners need to purchase
additional TDRs to develop their land to the fullest extent are generally
referred to as "receiving" zones.
2 6
The initial allocation of TEAs can be performed either by giving them
away, usually on the basis of past use of the resource in question, or by
auctioning them to the highest bidder. The former method seems much
more prevalent,2 7 perhaps reflecting the political strength of those groups
regulated by TEA programs. Another possibility, one utilized by the
emissions reduction credit (ERC) programs permitted by the Clean Air
Act,s is to assign each source a baseline connected to past activity levels,
with TEAs (in this case, ERCs) being granted when the entity makes
permanent reductions in emissions below that baseline?9 In other words, if
a factory is assigned a baseline of twenty tons of sulfur dioxide emissions
per year, and it makes permanent changes in its production process that
reduce its emissions to fifteen tons per year, it can then sell the right to emit
five tons of sulfur dioxide to another factory governed by the ERC
program.
It should be noted that although TEA programs can constitute the sole
regulation of a given resource, they need not. Such programs can also be
implemented in conjunction with command-and-control regulations, such as
those that mandate the use of specified pollution-abatement technology,
limit fishing to specified time periods, or restrict the permissible uses of
land.3°
B. How and Why Governments Might Curtail TEAs
Governments can curtail TEAs in numerous ways, but a few are most
significant for the purposes of this Note. Confiscation is the most obvious.
The government might decide that there is too much sulfur dioxide being
25. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 748 (1997) (Scalia. J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The cleverness of the scheme... is that it
causes the payment to come, not from the government but from third panies-whom the
government reimburses for their outlay by granting them (as the TDRs promise) a variance from
otherwise applicable land-use restrictions."). If the owners of restricted land own less restricted
parcels in the TDR region, they can also use their excess TDRs on those parcels.
26. See Miller, supra note 10, at 467.
27. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 403(a), 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(a) (1994).
28. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for Creation, Banking and
Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982).
29. See Lindgren, supra note 14, at 667-68, 677 (describing the ERC program); Savage,
supra note 12, at 231-37 (same).
30. See generally Hahn & Noll, supra note 4 (describing the problems associated with
simultaneous use of TEA programs and traditional command-and-control approaches).
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emitted, for instance, and so decide to confiscate a certain number of TEAs.
For programs in which TEAs are defined as a percentage of a total, cuts are
likely to take the form of a lowering of the total, with a consequent
reduction in the quantity represented by each TEA. Situations might arise,
however, in which one's percentage of the total allowable catch (TAC) is
lowered in order to include others who had previously been excluded from
the program without forcing them to buy in. For example, indigenous tribes
might decide to press hunting and fishing rights that had been neglected
previously." As a result, everyone's percentage of the TAC might be
reduced by thirty percent so that the indigenous tribe might be granted
thirty percent of the TAC.
Other possible regulatory changes that could be interpreted as curtailing
TEAs include imposing additional regulations that make the TEAs less
valuable and terminating the program altogether. Regulations that could
lower the value of TEAs include mandating new abatement technology,
shortening the fishing season, and imposing new land-use restrictions. Each
of these regulations might decrease the value of TEAs by lowering their
usefulness. At the extreme, ending the TEA program obviously makes the
TEAs that one has banked or bought valueless, although it might not
actually change the amount one is allowed to pollute, fish, or develop.
This Note is primarily concerned with those changes in TEA programs
that do not simply decrease the market value of individual TEAs, but that
decrease the legal rights embodied in a TEA, such as the amount of fish that
one can catch or pollution that one can emit. In short, my central focus is
the confiscation of TEAs and the lowering of TACs.32
Among the three categories of TEA programs, governments have more
reasons to confiscate TEAs in the context of extractions, particularly
when what is being extracted is wildlife such as fish, than in the
context of emissions or land development. Although new knowledge about
environmental conditions could cause the curtailment of TEAs with respect
to all three,33 changed conditions are most likely to force the government's
hand with respect to extractions. 4 For instance, since the point of regulating
31. Cf. Marshall v. The Queen [1999] 177 D.L.R. 513 (Can.) (granting the Mi'kmaq Tribe
fishing rights based on an 18th-century treaty). Another possibility is that one's percentage of the
TAC could be confiscated and given to others already in the program, thereby augmenting their
share.
32. See Lindgren, supra note 14, at 669 (describing the various ways that the legal rights
conveyed by TEAs can be confiscated in the context of the ERC program, such as "a discount to
reduce the value of all ERCs, an adjustment to increase the use ratio of ERCs, a confiscation of
banked ERCs, or a moratorium restricting the use of ERCs for a limited time") (footnotes
omitted).
33. For example, it might be discovered that the current fish stock is smaller than previously
thought or that the effects of sulfur dioxide are worse than previously thought.
34. See William K. Stevens, New Eye on Nature: The Real Constant Is Eternal Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 1990, at Cl (noting critiques of traditional equilibrium-based ecology and the
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commercial fishing is to ensure that the fish population exists in the future,
TACs are usually dictated by the size of the current stock and
environmental factors expected to affect the future size of the stock. With
emissions and land development, human preferences usually play a larger
role in setting the total cap.35 If conditions change in a way that makes the
effect of pollution worse, the government has more flexibility to decide
whether to tolerate the negative effect than in the fishing context. Once the
fish are gone, they are gone. Of course, it is possible, if unlikely, for
conditions to change so much that a health emergency is created that forces
a cut in the total amount of pollution allowed by the TEAs currently in
existence.36
Governments have perhaps the least reason of all to confiscate TEAs in
the context of land development. With TDR programs, although conditions
may change or new information come to light about the effect of
development on a particular land parcel, it is unlikely that conditions will
change in a way that would dictate lowering the amount of development
in the entire region governed by the TDR program." If an endangered
species were found on someone's plot of land, that would be no reason
to confiscate the landowner's TDRs, although it might be reason to make
them inapplicable to the plot where the endangered species was found.
The burdened landowner could still sell her TDRs to someone else who
owned less environmentally sensitive land. In fact, it might be decided
to give the burdened landowner additional TDRs to compensate for their
more limited applicability. A case could be made for confiscating TDRs if
complicated factors, including near-constant environmental disturbances, that determine fish
populations).
35. See, e.g., Providing Economic Incentives. supra note 1, at 480 (statement of roundtable
participant David Hawkins, Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council) (noting that "the
history of environmental protection is an increasing realization that what we thought was an
adequate or tolerable level of pollution 20 years ago is no longer a tolerable level of pollution
today").
36. Of course, it is also possible for the government to allow the fish stock to be fished out of
existence, but this is unlikely to be in the best interest of those who hold a percentage of the TAC.
In contrast, it generally is in the best interest of polluters to be allowed to pollute more rather than
less. This is related to a point that Carol Rose has made: Because overfishing is more of a pure
commons problem while pollution is more of a pure externalities problem, fishers have a greater
interest in wise public management of the resource in question than do polluters. Conversation
with Carol M. Rose, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, in New Haven. Conn. (Nov. 10, 1999).
37. This is because unlike the other two species of TEA programs, extractions and emissions,
TDR programs are usually more concerned with protecting certain sensitive areas within the TDR
area and not with the overall total of development within the area. See supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text. To the extent that this is not true, TDR programs aimed at protecting wildlife
become more like the individual transferable quota (ITQ) programs that govern fisheries. Even if
the TDR program is just a tool of general land-use management, governments could still
conceivably decide to confiscate TDRs. This might happen because a radical change in takings
doctrine leads them to believe that they no longer need to provide TDRs in order to avoid takings
claims. Alternatively, a municipality might simply have a newfound preference for less
development. These latter scenarios could hardly be characterized as ones in which changed
conditions " dictated" less development, however.
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the endangered species were found to pervade the TDR area, so that
appropriate "receiving" areas do not exist. An alternative to this scenario,
however, would be to extend the area governed by the TDR program in
order to create new receiving areas outside the range of the endangered
species's critical habitat. Depending on the geographic scope of the
regulating authority's jurisdiction, this latter alternative might require
intergovernmental cooperation.
C. The Nature and Measurement of Constitutionally Guaranteed
Compensation
The measure of compensation for confiscated TEAs likely would be
their market value, 8 minus, perhaps, any rise in the value of the remaining
TEAs owing to their increased scarcity. 39 Any rise in the market value of
the good eventually sold to the public because of its increased scarcity
would probably be reflected in the increased value of the remaining TEAs
and could be subtracted from compensation awards. Note that the
difficulties in making these calculations increase the transaction, or
"settlement," costs associated with providing compensation. In general,
settlement costs include the administrative costs of running compensation
programs and the economic distortions caused by raising taxes to pay for
the compensation.' These costs can be quite substantial and provide a
reason not to guarantee compensation.41
Not at issue in this Note is whether capital investments or land
purchases made in reliance on TEAs should be compensated when the
confiscation of TEAs makes them less valuable.4" Generally, statutes that
authorize TEA programs should address only the issue of compensation for
the TEAs themselves. Takings Clause doctrine and general compensation
statutes already govern the effect of TEA confiscation on other property
owned by the TEA-holder. For example, if all the TDRs necessary for
developing a plot of land are confiscated, the effect might be a "taking" of
38. This is in line with general Takings Clause doctrine that compensation is usually set at the
market value of the object taken and does not include consequential damages. See United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1945). Even if one wanted to tailor individuated
awards, determining the use value of confiscated TEAs to their holder is likely not to be an easy
matter. See Lindgren, supra note 14, at 693.
39. Cf WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 80-
83 (1995) (discussing the offsetting of compensation by the value added to one's remaining
property by a confiscatory state action, such as the value added to one's remaining property by a
new railroad line).
40. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1178-79, 1214 (1967).
41. See FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 96 (suggesting that settlement costs with respect to
eminent domain typically amount to as much as a quarter of the amount of compensation paid).
42. See supra note 38.
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that land, triggering constitutionally mandatory compensation under the
Takings Clause.43 This would be the case whether or not the statute creating
the TDR program promised compensation for the confiscated TDRs. That
the taking of the land was effected through the confiscation of TDRs is
incidental; the same effect could have been achieved through a direct
prohibition on development.'
The limited nature of the compensation at issue in this Note-
compensation based on the market value of the confiscated TEAs-affects
the relevant rationales for guaranteeing such compensation. In brief, to the
extent that the stakes are lower than they would be if capital and land
investments were at issue, political pragmatism and equity are less
important rationales for guaranteeing compensation for confiscated TEAs.
More importantly, as is discussed below, only in rare cases will the
guarantee of such confiscation have any impact on investment decisions,
since the compensation at issue is not linked to one's investments."3 One
would receive compensation for one's confiscated TEAs whether or not one
had made any investment based on them. Furthermore, the amount of
capital investment one made would not affect the amount of compensation
one received since compensation would be based solely on the market value
of the TEAs, not on the value of one's investments.'
II. POLICY RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST GUARANTEEING
COMPENSATION
The factors that are relevant to the government's decision to bind itself
constitutionally to provide compensation can be grouped under three main
headings: political pragmatism, equity, and efficiency. The promise of
43. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1029-30 (1992)
(holding that instances in which "all economically beneficial or productive use of land" is denied
constitute compensable takings, unless such uses constitute legally cognizable nuisances).
44. This is not to say that reliance on a TDR could not have some effect on takings analysis.
One factor in takings analysis is the extent to which a regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel. 524 U.S. 498, 500 (1998). The
possession of TEAs at least arguably supports the reasonableness of investment made in reliance
upon them. To some degree this will depend on the terms of the authorizing statute.
45. See infra Subsection II.C. 1.
46. The market value of TEAs will reflect to some extent the amount of capital investment
made in the industry as a whole. Hence, depending on the share of the industry that the TEA-
holder controls, her investment decisions might have some impact on the overall market value of
TEAs.
47. The trend is for the government to avoid binding itself by placing explicit anti-
compensation disclaimers in the statutes creating TEA programs. See, e.g., Sustainable Fisheries
Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining an "individual fishing quota" as a
permit that does not create any right, title, or interest in any fish before the fish is harvested, and
that may be revoked or limited at any time without compensation from the government); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 403, 42 U.S.C. § 765 1b(f) (1994) (" [A TEA is) a limited
authorization to emit sulfur dioxide .... Such allowance does not constitute a property right.
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compensation affects the efficiency of TEA programs by structuring the
incentives faced by both private and public decisionmakers." Because
public decisionmakers can take into account the effects of their actions on
private decisionmaking in the course of managing a TEA program, it is
ultimately the impact on public decisionmaking that is decisive for the issue
of constitutional protection. Specifically, if binding the government ex ante
to provide compensation is unlikely to improve subsequent government
decisions to confiscate TEAs or to provide compensation when it does
confiscate, then there is no reason to bind it in this way.
It should be kept in mind throughout the following discussion that the
government is free to provide compensation at the time that it confiscates
TEAs even if it did not promise to do so at the time that it created the
program. This dramatically affects the degree to which political pragmatism
and equity have to be considered when deciding whether or not to promise
compensation, especially since both values are primarily concerned with the
payment of compensation and not the promise of it.
The importance of ex post compensation and ex ante promises is
reversed in the case of efficiency. Efficiency is primarily a question of
structuring incentives by controlling expectations. Because guarantees can
affect expectations, they can have a profound impact on efficiency. The
actual payment of compensation is relevant in this regard only insofar as it
creates expectations of future compensation.49
A. Political Pragmatism
Political pragmatism can affect the issue of compensation at two points:
the time when the original statute or regulation creating the TEA program is
being formulated (T,), and the time when TEA cuts are contemplated and
implemented (T). Considerations of political pragmatism affect the
guarantee of compensation at T, in an obvious manner-such a guarantee
might be necessary to achieve passage and implementation of the TEA
program in the face of possible industry opposition. It is likely that at the
program-creation stage, the formula for the initial allocation of TEAs,
especially the question of whether or not the initial allocation should be
free, will generate more political jockeying than will the question of what to
Nothing in this subchapter... shall be construed to limit the authority of the United States to
terminate or limit such authorization.").
48. The settlement costs involved in providing compensation can also be considered under
the heading of efficiency.
49. Of course, if one makes a practice of not keeping one's promises, then they will cease to
structure the incentives of others effectively. The ability of such promises to structure incentives
also will depend on the degree to which the judiciary can and will force the government to keep
its own promises by making them constitutionally binding.
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do in case of future adverse alterations in the program.' Compensation,
after all, can be lobbied for at the time those future alterations are making
their way through the legislative or administrative process.
The potential regulatees are not the only potential source of opposition
to elements of a TEA program. Taxpayers and environmentalists might
object to the guarantee of future compensation in case of cuts; the former
because it could be money out of their pockets, the latter because they fear
that guarantees of compensation might obstruct future environmentally
beneficial changes in the program. Given the questionable morality of some
of the behavior regulated by TEA programs (for example, the emission of
sulfur dioxide that causes acid rain), some might feel that compensation is
unwarranted and perhaps downright inequitable. Because beliefs regarding
fairness motivate political action, it is not uncommon for considerations of
equity to affect considerations of political pragmatism.5
In less obvious ways, considerations of political pragmatism at
T, (when cuts are contemplated) might argue against guaranteeing
compensation at T. For example, taxpayer resistance at T, might make it
impossible to raise the revenue to pay compensation. 52 As a result, a
beneficial TEA cut might have to be forgone because compensation is
politically infeasible. As argued in Part Ill, it is admittedly more likely that
industry groups will have disproportionate political influence, making cuts
possible only if compensation accompanies them. But unless there is
a constitutional amendment banning compensation, the government is
always free to provide compensation at T, if political pragmatism so
requires, whether or not it has promised to do so at T."
50. This suggests that it might be more difficult politically to sell the TEAs and use the
proceeds to compensate future TEA takings than it would be simply not to promise compensation.
A smaller fee to create a compensation fund might be possible. however. I address this possibility
further infra note 120.
51. For an example of a public-choice explanation of the existence and evolution of property
rights that recognizes the impact of moral values on political action, see GARY D. LIBECAP.
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 12-19 (1989).
52. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the "Just
Compensation" Dilemma? Some Lessons from Public Choice and Positive Political Theory. 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 787, 806-07 (1997) (describing how initiative opponents mobilized taxpayers
to defeat Washington's property-rights initiative, which would have expanded dramatically the
compensation requirement, despite the array of well-organized special-interest groups in its
favor).
53. The possibility that constitutionally requiring compensation will impede meritorious
legislation is the basis of Daniel Farber and Phillip Frickey's public-choice argument against
applying takings law to situations in which legislation benefits diffuse groups at the expense of
more compact ones. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY. LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 72 (1991) ("We can assume that requiring compensation will make
such legislation harder to pass (otherwise, the legislature would have provided the compensation
voluntarily). Given the fact that diffuse beneficiary/concentrated cost legislation is already
excessively hard to pass, applying taking law would only create an additional barrier to much-
needed legislation."). Part I argues that beneficiaries of TEA cuts generally constitute a more
diffuse group than those hurt by them, namely, TEA-holders.
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B. Equity
Equity is primarily related to the issue of whether compensation should
be paid, not whether it should be promised.4 Of course, whether or not
compensation has been promised at T, affects the equity of providing it at T.
In other words, ex ante expectations affect ex post fairness. If one has been
warned at T that no compensation will be forthcoming in case of X, then
when X occurs one has a correspondingly weaker equity claim for
compensation. For example, it might be thought that auctioning TEAs
rather than giving them away creates stronger claims for compensation if
the TEAs are later confiscated. But if it was made clear at the time of the
auction that the TEAs were subject to confiscation without compensation,
then this risk should have been factored into their auction prices.
There are factors, however, that might make it unfair not to provide
compensation even if it has not been promised, and even if it has been
positively disavowed. Expectations can arise from sources other than
explicit promises. For example, a consistent practice of regulatory behavior,
including the practice of compensation, can give rise to reasonable
expectations even in the absence of promises. There might also be language
in the legislative history of a program that is designed to induce reliance
without rising to the level of an enforceable promise." Furthermore,
expectations might exist that predate the imposition of the TEA program.
For example, one might expect to be allowed to build a house on one's own
land given the state of current zoning regulations and the residential use of
neighboring lots. In other words, expectations might have arisen from what
is considered the "normal" use of property in an area. 6 In that case, the
imposition of a TDR program in which TDRs were allocated but then later
confiscated would violate expectations regarding development that predate
the program.
54. The exception to this would be if it were thought to be unfair to leave parties in a state of
uncertainty about whether compensation would be forthcoming in the event of confiscation.
55. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-952 (1990), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL
RESOURCES POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 10,726, 10,765-66 (1993) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY!
(statement of Representative Michael G. Oxley) (emphasizing that although compensation will not
be paid, "we in the Congress will be extremely reluctant to [revoke allowances]," and that TEA-
holders have "every reason to rely upon the continued existence and value of those allowances as
they design and undertake their compliance efforts").
56. Robert C. Ellickson and William A. Fischel both build general theories of the Takings
Clause on the basis of the distinction between regulations that prevent "normal" uses and those
that prevent "subnormal" uses, defined by reference to the uses prevalent in the surrounding
community. See FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 11-12, 351-64, Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 419-21 (1977) [hereinafter
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls]; Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 75, 82-83 (1996) [hereinafter Ellickson, Takings Legislation].
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Furthermore, there are aspects of equity that are not reducible to
expectations. These include the moral status of the activity being regulated,
the distribution of the burdens and benefits of the regulation, and
the characteristics of those being regulated. First, the nature of the
phenomena being regulated affects the equity of providing or withholding
compensation. For example, the more nuisance-like the activity, the less
equity favors compensation when the confiscation of TEAs prevents its
continuance. The opposite is true the more regulation simply looks like bad
luck, as, for example, when one is not allowed to farm or build a home
because an endangered rodent has been found on one's land." This mirrors
the longstanding distinction between regulations that prevent harms, and
hence do not require compensation, and those that press private property
into public service."a It should be noted that the distinction between
preventing harms and forcing benefits is not a sharp analytic one. What is
placed in each category can change over time, perhaps between the time a
TEA program is passed and the time cuts are made. This variability might
itself be a consideration that militates against binding oneself ex ante to
provide compensation.
A second factor is the extent to which the burden of the regulation is
concentrated on a few persons, as well as the degree to which the benefits
of the regulation flow to those burdened by it. The latter is referred to in the
takings literature as "reciprocity of advantage." 59 Cuts in a TAC will work
almost complete reciprocity of advantage among the fishers affected as long
as their permits are perpetual and each fisher has a similar discount rate.
Each makes a temporary sacrifice in order that the fish stock can rebound,
allowing the TAC, of which each has a percentage, to increase in the future.
If the stock continues to decline, this is likely to be because the cuts in the
TAC were not deep enough. In either case, fairness would not seem to
57. Cf. William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the
Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 63 (1996) (distinguishing
between the Clean Air Act, whose burdens should not require compensation, and the Endangered
Species Act, whose burdens should be compensated); Carol LaGrasse, Anti-Environmental?,
PERC REP. (Pacific Env't & Resources Ctr., Bozeman, Mont.), June 1999, at 5 (making an
equity-based case for compensation).
58. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922) (holding that
regulation aimed at preventing subsidence does not prevent a public nuisance and hence
constitutes a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987) (holding that regulation aimed at preventing subsidence does prevent a "significant threat
to the common welfare" and hence does not work a taking). For a skeptical view of the harm-
benefit distinction, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1024-25 (1992).
which notes that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is
often in the eye of the beholder." Similarly, see Michelman, supra note 40, at 1196-201.
59. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that New York's historic preservation ordinance does not
provide a reciprocity of advantage); Pennsylvania Coal Co.. 260 U.S. at 415; see also Michelman.
supra note 40, at 1218, 1223 (discussing the relevance of reciprocity of burdens and benefits to
both utilitarian and fairness approaches to the Takings Clause).
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require compensation for cuts in the TAC.6° However, fishers might have
legitimate fairness claims if their percentages of the TAC were reduced
without compensation.
Third, the nature of the regulatee might also affect the question of
equity. For example, whether the regulatee is a natural or an artificial
person (a corporation) might be seen as relevant, and given the distributive
aspect of the notion of equity, so might the wealth or poverty of the
regulatee.6t In short, there are equity considerations that are independent of
expectations created by promises or disavowals in the legislation creating
the TEA program. As a very general matter, these considerations might
favor compensation to a greater degree in the land-development context
than in the commercial-fishing and polluting contexts.62
However, even though fairness considerations might dictate
compensation in particular instances of confiscation, compensation should
be guaranteed only if one believes that the government cannot be trusted to
treat TEA-holders fairly when these situations arise. To the contrary, as Part
III argues, with the possible exception of some TDR programs, the
government is likely to give the interests of TEA-holders disproportionate
weight in their decisionmaking processes because TEA-holders will
60. In the case of permanent stock depletion, fairness might call for compensation if one felt
that the fishers were more victims of bad luck than victims of their own shortsightedness. Also,
one might have some sympathy for those small fishers who were driven out of business by a
temporary cut in the TAC and who might have a difficult time finding buyers for their permits.
61. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back
into the Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. I, 29 (1999) (noting
that while "controlling pollution by reducing [emission] allowances for older automobiles without
compensation might be very cost effective," it would be "unpalatable for its distributive effects
on society").
62. It should be noted that most of the equity considerations mentioned above have little
specifically to do with TEAs and their confiscation. It does not much matter with regard to them
whether the regulatory effect at issue is caused by a change in a TEA program or through other
sorts of regulation. What generally matters for purposes of fairness is the effect on the TEA-
holders' underlying property-for example, their developable land, emitting factory, or fishing
vessel. So if these effects are highly inequitable, compensation can be required by general takings
doctrine or by general compensation statutes that emphasize equity considerations, such as those
advocated by Robert Ellickson or William Treanor. See Ellickson, Takings Legislation, supra note
56; William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1174-76 (1997) (arguing for
compensation statutes that require case-by-case resolution on the basis of the equities involved.
especially the harm done by the regulation to the property owner in light of her total assets). If
confiscating TEAs constitutes a taking of the underlying property under takings doctrine or
statutory law, disclaimers in TEA statutes regarding compensation for the taking of TEAs are
irrelevant. It is not the taking of the TEAs that requires compensation in that case, but the taking
of the land, regardless of whether it was taken through the confiscation of TEAs or through
command-and-control regulation. For an equity-based argument in favor of compensation for
those indirectly affected by the imposition of environmental regulation, particularly workers who
lose jobs and the communities in which they live, see Dallas Burtraw, Compensating Losers When
Cost-Effective Environmental Policies Are Adopted, RESOURCES (Resources for the Future,
Washington, D.C.), Summer 1991, at 1.
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generally enjoy substantial organizational advantages in the political and
administrative arenas.
C. Efficiency: Structuring the hzcentives Faced by Private Decisionmakers
A TEA program should encourage TEA trading and provide incentives
that encourage TEA-holders to make the optimal level of investment in
productive capacity and abatement technology. 63 One possible fear is that
the risk of uncompensated TEA confiscation will obstruct both of these
goals.6 Two additional worries include the potentially negative effect of
such risk on the premature use of TEAs and on the resource stewardship
that is supposed to accompany property ownership.6 The four following
subsections analyze these issues: the effect of guaranteed compensation
on investment decisions, the timing of TEA usage, the amount of TEA
trading, and resource stewardship. My conclusions with regard to them are
that (1) the effect of guaranteed compensation on investment decisions
and on resource stewardship generally will be minimal; (2) guaranteed
compensation's primary positive effect on preventing the premature use of
TEAs wil be in the area of land development; and (3) guaranteed
compensation should have an across-the-board positive effect on the
incidence of TEA trading.
1. The Limited Effect of Guaranteed Compensation on Investment
Decisions
Traditional economic arguments can be marshaled both for and against
guaranteed compensation with respect to its effect on investment. On the
anti-compensation side, the argument is that if investors are rational and
63. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
64. See, e.g., Michael D. Young & Bonnie J. McCay. Building Equity. Stewardship and
Resilience into Market-Based Property Rights Systems, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: SocIAL AND EcoLoGIcAL IssuEs 87, 98 (Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe
eds., 1995) (asserting that "to encourage efficient investment ... unused entitlements should not
be taken from a rights holder without compensation"); Savage. supra note 12. at 228-29
("Confiscation would probably deter sources from creating ERCs. and thus society would lose the
benefits of ERC programs." (footnote omitted)). On the issue of trading. see, for example, Hahn
& Hester, supra note 2, at 379 ("To the extent that future confiscation is probable, the value of
rights is reduced and fewer advantageous trades can be made.").
65. On the stewardship issue, see Young & McCay. supra note 64. at 90. which asserts that
the practice of defining TEAs as revocable privileges - works against ... giving the holder a stake
in the long-term." Others, however, worry that with compensation guaranteed for confiscations.
"the government could potentially be forced to pay huge sums of money." Austin. supra note 14,
at 326; see also Testimony of the Environmental Defense Fund Concerning Individual
Transferable Quotas for Fish Harvest Privileges: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
Management of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 103d Cong. 5 (1994)
(statement of Rodney M. Fujita & D. Douglas Hopkins. Envtl. Defense Fund); Tipton. supra note
6, at 410-12.
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risk- neutral, then guaranteed compensation will lead to overinvestment. On
the pro-compensation side, the argument is that if investors are risk-averse,
then lack of guaranteed compensation will lead to underinvestment. The
main argument of this Subsection is that except for ERC-type TEA
programs,66 guaranteed compensation for the confiscation of TEAs should
have little or no effect-positive or negative-on private investment. This
is because such compensation does not protect capital investments, but
rather, only the TEAs themselves. This argument applies to all three TEA
contexts: emissions, extractions, and land development.
The general argument against compensation is that it causes moral
hazard.67 To the extent that investors are insured against losses, they have
less incentive to avoid them. Put another way, the promise of compensation
allows investors to ignore those risks for which they know they will be
compensated. As a result, they will overinvest.68 Consider three scenarios.
In the first, one is deciding whether to build a new factory whose market
value upon completion will be $100,000, and no risk of confiscation exists.
Given that scenario, one would decide to build the factory if it
cost less than $100,000 to do SO. 69 In the second scenario, there is a fifty-
percent chance that the government will confiscate one's land without
compensation and tear down the factory in order to build a post office. In
that case, it would be economically rational, if one were risk-neutral,
to build the factory only if it cost less than $50,000 to do so. In the
third scenario, there still is a fifty-percent risk of confiscation, but the
government guarantees compensation for the market value of the factory
should the confiscation occur. In this last scenario, one would once again
build the factory as long as it cost less than $100,000 to do so. The promise
of compensation puts the investor in effectively the same position as if there
were no risk of confiscation. It does not put society at large in the same
position, however. In this last scenario, there is now a fifty-percent chance
that every dollar invested in building the factory will be wasted because it
will be torn down for the post office. That money could have been invested
elsewhere. From an ex ante perspective, given a fifty-percent risk of
66. Recall that "ERC" refers to emission reduction credits. For a definition of ERC-type
programs, see supra text accompanying notes 28-29. For the explanation of why they are
exceptional, see infra text accompanying notes 78-83.
67. For a brief discussion of the moral-hazard problem in the context of an argument for the
superiority of private insurance over public compensation, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 536-41 (1986).
68. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 618-20 (1984); Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When
Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. EcON. 71 (1984).
69. For simplicity's sake, I am putting aside the question of opportunity costs and interest
rates. I am also ignoring the possibility that the factory might be worth more than its market value
to its builder-owner.
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confiscation and demolition, every dollar that is spent above $50,000 on
building the $100,000 factory represents a deadweight loss.
The basic point is that efficiency requires that all risks be taken
into account when making investment decisions, and the promise of
compensation allows investors to ignore those risks for which they
will be compensated. Given risk neutrality and accurate information,
noncompensation does not cause underinvestment, but compensation does
cause overinvestment.
The general argument for compensation is that many investors are in
fact risk-averse and will underinvest in the face of uncertainty." The task
then becomes separating the risk-averse from the risk-neutral and
controlling for overinvestment."
Except for a particular type of program that will be discussed later"2
however, neither of these arguments is relevant to the issue that is the
subject of this Note, namely, whether market value compensation should be
guaranteed for confiscated TEAs. For as long as one is not compensated for
one's sunk investments, there is no danger of moral hazard-that is, of
overinvestment. As has already been discussed,73 under the proposals that
are the subject of this Note, TEA-holders receive compensation for their
confiscated TEAs regardless of whether they have invested a dime in
producing pollution or catching fish. Investors should definitely take into
consideration the possibility that TEAs will be confiscated when they make
their investment decisions. But whether or not they will be compensated for
confiscated TEAs should have no impact on such decisions. In either case,
their investment might be stranded.74
For example, suppose that a fisher is trying to decide whether to buy a
new fishing boat. With the individual transferable quota (ITQ) she currently
holds, the purchase is a good investment. But she knows for a certainty that
a fifty-percent cut in the TAC is about to take place, and that this cut will
make the purchase a bad investment. In this situation, she will not buy the
boat whether or not she is guaranteed compensation for her diminished
ITQ, for in either case, she will lose money on the boat if the cut occurs.
Whether or not she purchases the boat does not affect the compensation she
70. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 68, at 590-92; Susan Rose-Ackerman. Against Ad
Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697. 1704-05 (1988).
71. For attempts along these lines, see the sources cited supra notes 68 and 70.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 78-83.
73. See supra Section LC.
74. It should be noted that the confiscation of some TEAs, as long as others are left in
existence, does not itself make investments unusable in the way that a direct command might.
Even if some of one's TEAs are confiscated, one can make up the shortfall by buying TEAs from
other TEA-holders. However, since the confiscation is presumed to be across-the-board, TEAs
will be more scarce and hence more expensive. This increased cost might make it unprofitable to
operate one's factory, boat, and other capital assets, hence stranding them indirectly.
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will receive for her diminished ITQ.75 Similar examples could be
formulated when the object of investment is a polluting factory, pollution-
abatement technology, or a house.
It is important to note that the above is an argument that the guarantee
of compensation for TEAs is irrelevant to investment decisions generally
and not just that such guarantees do not cause moral-hazard problems.
As long as the confiscation of TEAs and their level of compensation
are not linked to investment in capital, the guarantee of compensation
will neither induce overinvestment nor prevent underinvestment. Hence,
the desire for optimal investment neither supports nor argues against
guaranteed compensation for confiscated TEAs. Risk aversion will result in
underinvestment, but the only way to prevent this is to compensate for the
stranded investment, not for the TEAs that are confiscated. So if the optimal
structuring of investment incentives was the only factor in favor of
guaranteeing compensation, then the ubiquity of settlement costs would be
enough to rule against such guarantees. As argued below, however, the
guarantee of compensation might have some positive effects, such as
preventing inefficient races to develop7 6 and promoting TEA trading.
77
This argument assumes that one's investments do not affect the number
of TEAs that one will have confiscated. However, this will not be the case
if instead of being allocated at the start, as is primarily the case with the
sulfur dioxide program, 78 TEAs are created by investment decisions. For
example, as briefly described earlier,79 in emission reduction credit (ERC)
programs, each source is granted a pollution baseline and is awarded ERCs
when it makes permanent cuts below this baseline." With ERC-type
programs, the risk of confiscation without compensation will decrease the
75. If compensation is based not on the market value of the TEAs, but rather on their use
value to their holder, then capital investment will affect the amount of compensation paid.
However, since factors other than capital investment affect the use value of TEAs, one will likely
receive much less than a dollar-for-dollar return in compensation for the amount invested. Hence,
the moral-hazard problem, as well as the general insurance benefits of compensation, should be
relatively minor. For factors affecting the use value of TEAs in the context of emission programs,
see Lindgren, supra note 14, at 693.
76. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
77. See infra Subsection II.C.3.
78. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §§ 402(3), 403, 42 U.S.C. §§ 765 1a(3),
765 lb (1994) (allotting to regulatees a certain number of annual allowances, each of which allows
them to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide). Given the structure of the sulfur dioxide program created
by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress's concern that there is little reason to undergo
the costs of "overcontrol... [i]f [TEAs] could be easily revoked or even altered" is largely
misplaced. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 10,766. As long as they are uniform,
everyone is affected by cuts, whether or not they previously overcontrolled.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
80. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for Creation, Banking and
Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,077 (1982).
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incentive to create ERCs through overcontrol.8 ' Why bother to make the
investment in abatement technology or otherwise decrease one's level
of pollution if the government can just step in and confiscate without
compensation the fruit of one's labor, the ERCs? Guaranteed compensation
for one's ERCs eliminates this disincentive to creating them.2
Note, however, that the disincentive arises because confiscation of
ERCs disfavors regulatees who create ERCs through overcontrol, relative to
those who operate to the full extent of their baseline, and therefore have no
ERCs to confiscate. To borrow a fable, the frugal and industrious ants are
not allowed to retain the products of their labor, while the frivolous
grasshopper is unaffected. But instead of confiscating the ants' ERCs, the
government can achieve its cuts by lowering everyone's baseline-ant and
grasshopper alike. Lowering the baseline will actually make the ants' ERCs
more valuable by raising demand for them. If the grasshopper has already
exceeded the new lowered baseline, he will have to make up the difference
by buying ERCs from the ants. If there are not enough ERCs to go around,
the difference can be made up through decreases in the grasshopper's future
baselines. In short, in an ERC-type program, there is rarely a good reason
for the government to confiscate banked ERCs rather than simply to lower
everyone's baselines.8 3
2. Preventing the Race To Beat Anticipated Confiscations
A problem analogous to the one described in the ERC context will
occur if, instead of confiscating on the basis of the total number of permits
issued for a certain period, the government confiscates on the basis of the
number of permits in existence at the time of the confiscation. For in that
case, the risk of confiscation without compensation will give TEA-holders
an incentive to use their TEAs sooner than they would otherwise. This
might cause higher-than-optimal activity levels at the beginning of the TEA
period-a race to fish or to pollute or to develop'-since doing so would
81. It is in this narrow circumstance that Congress's recognition that the risk of revocation or
alteration decreases incentives for overcontrol is justified. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
55, at 10,766.
82. Just as the moral-hazard argument can be made any time the guarantee of compensation
affects investment decisions, it can be made in this case. Namely, one could argue that it is
efficient for investors to take into account the risk of confiscation when deciding whether to
overcontrol, otherwise they will either underinvest in productive capacity or overinvest in
abatement technology. However, since the rationale behind the confiscation in ERCs would
presumably be that too much pollution exists, overcontrol in the previous period is obviously part
of the solution and not part of the problem. In other words, in the face of possible cuts at T
, 
it is
efficient to retain incentives to overcontrol at T,.
83. This obviously will not be the case when the government has committed itself to a certain
baseline and therefore cannot lower it due to political or legal considerations.
84. See David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race To Develop, 143 U. PA. L REV.
655, 656 (1995) (describing how "It]he absence of a compensation requirement encourages
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decrease one's exposure to confiscation. In this circumstance, the guarantee
of compensation for confiscated TEAs would have a positive effect because
it would erase the incentive to beat the anticipated cuts.85
Whereas in the case of ERC confiscation the problem was favoring the
grasshopper over the frugal and industrious ant, here the problem is
favoring the wasteful hare, who inefficiently races to use her TEAs, over
the tortoise. Consequently, the solution to the problem is similar: Instead of
favoring the hare over the tortoise, treat both alike by basing cuts on the
total amount of allowances granted between renewal periods, and not just
those remaining. There will be a problem, however, when regulatees no
longer hold as many TEAs as the government wants to cut. For example,
imagine a situation in which a TEA-holder who was originally granted one
hundred TEAs has used eighty-five of them. In that case, an across-the-
board cut of twenty percent of all TEAs is not strictly possible. One can
approximate a twenty-percent cut by confiscating the TEA-holders'
remaining fifteen TEAs and an additional five from the next allocation.
This eliminates the incentive to race to use one's allowances, but it will
not result in an immediate twenty-percent cut. Of course, government
decisionmakers can take this into account when they are deciding on the
size of the cuts to be made.86
But while the above solution might work with TEA programs that
regulate emissions and extractions that occur on a continuous basis, it will
not work in the development context. For unlike other TEAs, TDRs are
generally not allocated over periods. Once one has used one's TDRs and
developed one's land, that is the end of the matter. There is little that the
government can do besides destroying the structure one has built, which
likely would constitute a taking since it was built with valid TDRs. There
are no future allocations from which the government can deduct the TDRs
one has used.
property owners to accelerate development in order to avoid regulatory losses from future
preservation regulation"); cf Innes, supra note 10, at 406 (describing how a TDR system can
avoid premature development by promising compensation to owners of undeveloped property in
the form of TDRs that can be applied to other parcels).
85. This is true whether TEAs are defined as absolute quantities or as percentages of a total.
In either case, if one expects a decrease in the future, then without a guarantee of compensation,
one has an incentive to use one's current quota before the cut takes effect. For example, if one has
TEAs that allow one to catch 10% of the total set for the fishery, and if one suspects that the total
is about to be decreased, one has an incentive to catch one's share before the decrease in the TAC
takes place. This might have some incidental effect on the fish stock and hence on future increases
in the TAC, but since the quick fisher captures all of the benefits of beating the cut and shares the
cost to the TAC with all the fishery's fishers, he has an incentive to do so.
86. An alternative is to wait until the renewal period to make the cuts. However, a crisis, such
as a crash in the fish population, might make this impossible. A compromise with respect to
compensation would be to promise not to make any cuts without compensation between renewal
periods, the length of which would depend on the nature of the resource, but to reserve the right to
make cuts without compensation at the end of the period. See Young & McCay, supra note 64, at
98.
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In conclusion, the race-prevention rationale for guaranteed
compensation is stronger in the development context than in the extraction
and emission contexts. The key difference is that in the latter situations
there are future renewal periods during which cuts can be made to penalize
those who used their TEAs prior to previous cuts.
3. The Positive Effect of Guaranteed Compensation on TEA Trading
It is unclear, prima facie, why the risk of confiscation without
compensation would discourage trading. The proposition that because the
risk of confiscation lowers the value of TEAs, there will be less trading, is a
non sequitur.' If the risk of such confiscation is twenty percent, then
potential buyers and sellers should simply deduct twenty percent from their
asking and offering prices and proceed as before.
The real problem is not that the risk of uncompensated confiscation
lowers the value of TEAs, but that it adds to uncertainty as to their value.
Buyers and sellers frequently do not know the probability of alterations in
government programs, at least not too far in advance, and hence cannot
simply discount their asking and offering prices. Unlike hurricanes and
other natural phenomena, political action is volitional and hence less easy to
predict."8 One result of this additional uncertainty about pricing is that
fewer trades are likely to be made." Efforts to discern the value of a good
to oneself and to potential trading partners is a transaction cost, and
anything that makes that effort more difficult raises transaction costs. And
the higher the cost of making transactions, the fewer of them will be
made. Hence, when uncertainty over the value of TEAs is caused by the
possibility of confiscation or other adverse alterations, promising to provide
compensation removes this obstruction to trading.
With respect to cuts in a TAC, however, the uncertainty involved is
more like that caused by a hurricane, insofar as TACs are tied to the size of
87. See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, supra note 2. at 379.
88. Fischel argues that economists who model the takings issue on an insurance paradigm
misconstrue the true nature of the problem because, unlike natural phenomena, government
takings are intentional and hence can be demoralizing to their victims in a way that natural
occurrences cannot be (this is the distinction between being robbed and losing one's wallet).
Furthermore, because of their intentional character, the incidence of government takings can be
altered by a requirement of compensation, unlike the incidence of natural phenomena. See
FIscHEL, supra note 39, at 191; William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and
Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1988); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro,
Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Connents on Economic Interpretations of "Just
Compensation" Lav, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988).
89. Various authors have made this observation in the context of TEA programs. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 130-31, 140 (1989); Langley-Hawthorne,
supra note 4, at 301 (stating that TEA programs have typically generated a low number of trades
due to restrictions and "uncertainty over the value" of TEAs).
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the fish stock. If, as discussed earlier,9" there is radical uncertainty as to the
optimal size of the TAC, this militates against using TEA systems to
regulate the taking of wildlife in the first place. It is not an argument in
favor of guaranteeing compensation in case the TAC has to be cut.
4. The Limited Effect of Guaranteed Compensation on the
Stewardship of Resources
The argument of this Subsection is that the lack of a constitutional right
to compensation does not inhibit the ability of a TEA program to create
stewardship incentives for TEA-holders. This is because TEA programs are
inherently unable to create such incentives whether or not compensation is
guaranteed. This is true whether it is emissions, extractions, or land
development that are being regulated.
The general idea behind privatizing the commons is that owners have
an incentive to husband the resources that they own. 9' As long as the
resources cannot be taken away from the owner without just compensation,
the owner has an incentive to maximize their value. It might be concluded
that TEAs fail to provide proper stewardship incentives9" because they are
generally short-term and revocable without compensation. But the problem
is not that TEAs are insufficiently secure; rather, the problem is
that possession of them does not constitute ownership of a discrete
resource. TEAs are merely "hybrid property" defined in relation "to a
larger resource whose total use has been consciously limited through
regulation." 93 One has an incentive to husband one's own share but only a
very limited incentive to husband the larger resource, even if one's share is
defined as a percentage of the larger resource.94 That "stewardship
incentives" are never mentioned in connection with emission allowances or
development rights, but only in connection with fishing quotas,9' is
evidence of this. While no one expects emission allowances to create
stewardship incentives with respect to the atmosphere, commentators are
misled by the more limited nature of a fishery into believing that a fishing
allowance can create such incentives. But even though there is a closer
connection between one's fishing activity and one's future fishing rights
90. See supra note 21.
91. See Young & McCay, supra note 64, at 94.
92. See Rieser, Prescriptions, supra note 6, at 416; Rieser, Property Rights, supra note 6, at
822 (arguing that without a right of compensation, ITQs provide insufficient certainty "to invest
in the long-term value of the resource," that is, they create no "stewardship incentives"), Young
& McCay, supra note 64, at 90, 98.
93. Rose, The Several Futures of Property, supra note I, at 164. The phrase "hybrid
property" is Richard Stewart's. See Richard B. Stewart, Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond. 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 93 (1990).
94. One's stewardship incentive is in direct proportion to the size of one's share.
95. See sources cited supra note 92.
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than between one's polluting and one's future polluting rights, even in the
fishing context, the costs of one's own actions only partly redound to
oneself, while all of the benefits do." In short, limited stewardship
incentives are an inherent part of TEA systems and are not affected by
guarantees of compensation.
D. Alternatives to Guaranteeing Compensation To Achieve Certainty
The analysis in the previous Section suggests that there are some
efficiency advantages to granting compensation, primarily in preventing
races to develop and in bolstering TEA trading. The guarantee of
compensation is not costless, however. In addition to the settlement costs
involved in determining the appropriate level of compensation and in
finding the funds necessary to provide the compensation, there is
the possible loss in government flexibility, the possible inequity of
compensation, and the possibility that necessary cuts will not be
made because the compensation cannot be financed. Hence, if there are
ways of lowering uncertainty aside from constitutionally guaranteeing
compensation, they should be pursued.
One alternative is assurances made in a form that is not constitutionally
enforceable. For example, while admitting that no compensation would be
forthcoming, Representative Michael Oxley's remarks regarding the Clean
Air Act's sulfur dioxide program assured TEA-holders that "we in the
Congress will be extremely reluctant" to "limit or to revoke allowances.""
Representative Oxley also mentioned a second way to decrease uncertainty
with respect to confiscation: making it procedurally difficult, specifically by
requiring that confiscation be authorized by an act of Congress and ratified
by the President." Of course, if lack of flexibility is a concern, procedural
hurdles might be a worse alternative than guaranteed compensation.
A third alternative is simply to act in a predictable manner over time.
For example, Franz Thomas Litz emphasizes the importance of regulatory
predictability to the success of the TEA program created in order to manage
the harvesting of surf clams."° Litz's discussion is notable for what it
leaves out: any mention of mandatory compensation for regulatory changes.
96. This is exactly the dynamic that creates the "tragedy of the commons." See Garret
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
97. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. If there is little trading activity, it might be
difficult to determine fair market value. Risk of confiscation is not the only factor creating
transaction costs in the trading of TEAs. In the alternative, discerning the use value of the TEA to
its holder might be very difficult and speculative. See Lindgren. supra note 14, at 693.
98. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 10.766.
99. See id. at 10,765-66; cf. Young & McCay, supra note 64. at 98 (arguing that processes
reviewing potential changes in TEA programs should be designed so that their "likely outcomes
are as predictable as possible").
100. See Litz, supra note 6, at 354-56.
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Instead, "a great degree of certainty in the property interest conveyed in the
surf clam ITQ" was simply a result of fishery managers' acting predictably
over time.1"' Specifically, managers did not change the TAC and did not
impose additional reporting costs. 0 2 In combination with assurances, such
consistent regulatory management can not only create greater certainty
regarding the value of TEAs, thereby facilitating trading, but also can
provide the predictability necessary to make optimal investment decisions,
something that guaranteed compensation for the market value of TEAs
cannot do."0 3
Of course, unforeseen events may eventually force government
decisionmakers to make changes in the TAC, but the point of the surf clam
example is that government decisionmakers can take into account the costs
of creating uncertainty when deciding how to act. In other words, when
deciding whether to alter a TEA program and whether to provide
compensation, government decisionmakers can factor into their decisions
the importance of maintaining certainty.'O° Sometimes the importance of
maintaining certainty will dictate not changing the program or will allow
change but dictate compensation. At other times, however, it will dictate
neither, or it will dictate only that changes be moderated.
The relevant question can be narrowed to whether a constitutionally
enforceable promise to compensate would provide a more optimal level
of certainty, given that such promises have their costs as well as their
benefits, than would normal government decisionmaking. In other words,
an ideal government will provide assurances and compensation in an
optimal manner by taking into account all of their costs and benefits.' The
idea behind a government's constitutionally binding itself to provide
compensation, and behind constitutional guarantees generally, is that the
government does not trust itself to act in an ideal manner. "0 The question
is whether the overprotection provided by a blanket guarantee of
compensation comes closer to the ideal level of protection than does normal
government decisionmaking. As will be argued in Part III, the answer
101. Id. at 356.
102. See id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
104. Part III argues that given the importance of certainty to TEA-holders, who form a
significant political constituency, government officials are unlikely to underestimate its
importance when making policy decisions.
105. That equity considerations may militate both for and against compensation in particular
instances should also be kept in mind. See supra Section II.B.
106. This can be considered a particular application of process-based theories of
constitutionalism, which posit that there needs to be a reason to distrust the normal political
process in order to justify constitutionally protecting a right or interest. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980). This is especially true when there is a danger that the
right or interest in question will be overprotected. The possibility of overprotection arises in the
compensation context because there will at least be some occasions when the costs of providing
compensation will outweigh the benefits, broadly understood.
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is that in at least two out of the three TEA categories-emissions and
extractions-the answer is likely to be "no," since the organizational
advantages of industrial polluters and commercial fishers make it unlikely
that they will be underprotected by the political process.' °7 In the third TEA
category-land development-the political strength of TEA-holders is
more precarious and, in certain contexts, the political process may result in
underprotection. Whether this underprotection undershoots the ideal level
of protection by more than guaranteed compensation overshoots it is
another question, but because the alternatives mentioned above probably
will not provide certainty as effectively as would a constitutional guarantee,
one might want to err on the side of caution in certain land-use contexts.
III. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY: STRUCTURING THE INCENTIVES FACED BY
PUBLIC DECISIONMAKERS
There are two basic ways in which a mandatory-compensation rule
could affect governmental decisionmaking. First, it could result in the
government's paying compensation when it otherwise would not. Second,
knowledge that it had to pay compensation for certain actions might
dissuade the government from performing them." But given the usual
array of political forces in the typical TEA context, there will already be a
pro-TEA-holder bias in government decisionmaking on both scores. As a
result, it is unlikely that an ex ante requirement to provide compensation
would often result in the government's providing compensation when it
otherwise would not have done so, but should have. 9 The one exception
might arise in the context of a TDR program when owners of undeveloped
land are uniquely burdened by TDR confiscations.
A. The Generally Disproportionate Political Influence of TEA-Holders
It is a near truism in economics that making people pay for the
resources they acquire promotes efficiency. In the case of government,
unless it is willing to compensate those harmed by one of its measures,
there is no guarantee that the measure in question would result in a net
gain."' The assumption is that the government is just like any other
107. Since they are already likely to be overprotected by the political process, further
protection by a constitutional guarantee of compensation is superfluous at best.
108. In other words, mandatory compensation could act as do liability rules generally in
structuring the incentives faced by potential tortfeasors.
109. A mandatory requirement of monetary compensation could affect government
decisionmaking, however, when, for budgetary or public-relations reasons, the government would
prefer to provide in-kind compensation, such as regulatory benefits, rather than money.
110. Frank Michelman puts this point more strongly: "[l't would appear that any measure
which society... is unwilling to finance under conditions of full compensation, society cannot
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economic actor, and that if it is not forced to internalize the costs of its
activities, then it will just ignore them."' The government, however, is not
like any other actor.
The government is not a simple or self-contained entity, and strictly
speaking, it is both impossible and undesirable to force it to internalize
either the costs or the benefits of its actions. The "government" does not
pay compensation; taxpayers and holders of government debt do. Likewise,
the benefits of government action do not redound to government actors, at
least not completely. There is no more reason, a priori, to think that the
government will ignore the costs of its activity than that it will ignore
the benefits. In fact, some public choice theorists have argued that in the
typical takings context the exact opposite is more likely: government
underestimation of policy benefits rather than underestimation of policy
costs."2 This is simply because those harmed are likely to be better able to
form an organized pressure group than are the beneficiaries, who usually
will be a relatively diffuse group. This is especially likely to be the case in
the context of TEA confiscation in that the very existence of TEA programs
brings into existence a standing interest group composed of those subject to
the regulation.
The interest-group model of politics posits that, given information
costs, the intermittent nature of elections, and "the memory decay" of most
voters, it is the competition among interest groups, such as TEA-holders,
environmentalists, and taxpayers, that is the primary determinant of
government policy." 3 Even in purely electoral politics, organized interests
that can deliver campaign contributions or votes in a bloc, and as a result
can use them as a bargaining chip, have an advantage over interests that are
not organized. This interest-group competition is not without its biases.
afford at all." Michelman, supra note 40. at 1181 (footnote omitted). In other words, if "society"
is unwilling fully to compensate the losers, then total costs must outweigh total benefits. But this
not only ignores settlement costs; it also begs all sorts of questions by eliding the distinction
between society and government and then assuming a global view of societal rationality.
I 11. This is a standard argument in the takings literature and is referred to as "fiscal
illusion." See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 68, at 620-22; Blume et al., supra note 68. at 88-90;
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (3d ed. 1986) (making the fiscal-
illusion argument without using the term); Louis De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for
Government Investment Choices, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 13 (1969) (same); Michael A. Heller &
James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999.
1006 (1999) (same).
112. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY
279 (1992); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.. A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1902). By "typical takings context," I mean situations such as the
confiscation of people's land for the building of a road or its functional confiscation for the
protection of a wetland. In these cases, those harmed share an intense and easily recognizable
interest and, at least in the first instance, are geographically contiguous.
113. See, e.g., I BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 240-42, 245-48
(1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE To
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 15-16 (1997); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNI;Y,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3-4 (1986).
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Perhaps the most important factor in interest-group effectiveness, and
certainly the most explored in the public-choice literature, is the level of
organization." 4 Generally speaking, the smaller the group and the higher its
stakes per member, the tighter its organization. Some shared interests, if
sufficiently diffuse, will give rise to no organized advocacy on their behalf.
This observation is seen as so important that Daniel Farber can accurately
state that "[i]f public choice has any one key finding, it is that small groups
with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political
process." 115
As Mancur Olson explains, the problem that interest groups face is how
to get those who share the interest to share the costs of organizing and
lobbying as well, and not to free-ride on the efforts of other members of the
group."' The larger the group, the less the contribution of any one
individual matters and the more difficult it is to reach and enforce
agreements to contribute."7 This is a particular instance of the public-goods
problem that arises when people cannot be excluded from receiving
benefits-in this case, those resulting from the interest group's lobbying
activity. If they cannot be excluded, then they have an incentive to free-ride
since they will receive the benefits whether or not they bear the costs. In
brief, smaller groups that are clearly defined and in which each member has
a high stake in the outcome will have an easier time preventing free-riding
on their political activity than will more diffuse groups.'1
8
TEA-holders are likely to fit rather well the characterization of a group
with low organizational costs, while their political opponents-general
taxpayers, environmental groups, and those affected by the TEA-holders'
activities-are not. This is especially true when TEA-holders form a group
united by occupation, as is likely to be the case in the emissions and
extractions contexts. This distortion in political voice is problematic even if
one does not accept a purely self-interested view of politics that reduces it
to economic competition by other means. For even when government
officials are trying to decide an issue purely on the merits, they often have
to rely on the information and arguments provided by partisan groups.
Advantages in the form of lower organizational costs lead to advantages in
114. Other factors include wealth, education, social prejudices. and predisposition to political
activity. There is no reason to believe that TEA-holders will be disadvantaged with respect to any
of these.
115. Farber, supra note 112, at 289 (footnote omitted): see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra
note 53, at 12-37; William N. Eskidge, Jr.. Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275. 285-95 (1988).
116. See OLSON, supra note 17, at 9-16.
117. See id. at 9-16,60-65.
118. See id. at 28-36, 53-57.
2000] 2011
The Yale Law Journal
voice.' And in democratic politics it is usually the squeaky wheel that gets
the grease.
As a result, if there is a bias in government decisionmaking, it will be in
favor of not cutting TEAs and providing compensation when it does cut
them. '2 While taxpayers will barely notice the effect of any one instance
of compensation on their tax bill, TEA-holders will certainly notice the
absence of it. In turn, they will make sure that the relevant government
decisionmakers are made painfully aware of the cost of the TEA cuts. The
only occasions in which binding guarantees will result in compensation that
the government would not have granted anyway are when the costs
of compensating in terms of efficiency and equity are so great, even
taking into account the benefits of increased TEA trading and lack of
racing behavior, that they outweigh the TEA-holders' organizational
advantages.''
B. Industrial Polluters
Because of monitoring limitations and other administrative obstacles,
TEA programs regulating emissions are likely to target readily identifiable
"point" sources of pollution such as the electric utilities regulated by the
Clean Air Act's sulfur dioxide program. 2' Furthermore, although there is
perhaps less reason for it, TEA programs tend to target specific industries,
such as electric utilities and automobile production. 23 To the extent that this
is so, TEA-holders in the emissions context are a paradigm of the special-
interest group with disproportionate influence. 2" They are a relatively small
119. See Lunney, supra note 112, at 1950-54. Also, to the extent that TEA-holders participate
in and exercise influence over the decision to make TEA rescissions, uncertainty over TEA cuts is
reduced.
120. Because TEA-holders will often either gain compensation or provide stiff resistance to
TEA cuts, creating a compensation fund financed by TEA-holder contributions should be
considered if it is politically feasible. In this way, TEA-holders could be forced to self-insure.
121. It might be objected that one of the natural political opponents of TEA-holders-
environmental groups--does, in fact, wield significant political influence. Such groups. however,
still face sizable organizational hurdles relative to industry groups and these hurdles significantly
decrease their influence. The question is not whether a group is politically powerful, but whether
it is politically powerful relative to the interests that it represents. Sometimes groups representing
diffuse interests do manage to succeed in the political arena, but this does not negate the fact that
they operate at a distinct organizational disadvantage. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
122. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §§ 402(17), 403, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651a(17).
765 1b (1994).
123. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 80.20(d) (1988) (implementing the lead phasedown program for
automobile exhaust); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed.
Reg. 13,116 (1985) (same).
124. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 17, at 141-48 (discussing the disproportionate political
influence commonly attributed to business groups). As Olson notes, while other groups such as
workers and consumers are organized only occasionally, "business interests are organized as a
general rule." Id. at 143. Olson attributes this "high degree of organization" in large part "to the
fact that the business community is divided into a series of. . . 'industries,' each of which contains
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group with high stakes that is organized by industry, all characteristics
conducive to low organization costs. They are also likely to have substantial
resources at their command.
The threat of uncompensated TEA confiscations will often unite an
industry in a way that other regulations aimed at lowering the amount of
pollution might not. For example, it has long been observed that industrial
regulations can advantage existing firms at the expense of potential market
entrants and consumers by raising barriers to entry into the industry."
Furthermore, small firms may have more difficulty shouldering the burden
imposed by regulations."26 When this is the case, the large firms might offer
only token resistance or perhaps even support the regulation. This is not
likely to occur in the context of across-the-board TEA confiscations. Each
firm loses the same percentage of its TEAs as every other. This might hurt
some firms more than others, but it is unlikely to create a net benefit for any
of them. 27 There is also no reason to believe that it will not hurt large fums
as much as small firms in any systematic way.
This argument regarding the unifying effects of TEA confiscation will,
of course, not hold true if confiscations or compensation for them are
selective."2S It is the fear of selective compensation with respect to land
confiscations that forms the basis of Daniel Farber's argument in favor of
constitutionally guaranteed compensation in the name of "horizontal
equity." " I believe, however, that Farber had in mind selectivity among
those affected by different projects and not selectivity among those affected
by the same project. In other words, he was worried that those who lost
their land as a result of one highway project, for instance, would not be
compensated, while those whose land was taken for another highway would
be, not that among those who had their land taken for the same highway
project, some would be compensated and others would not. Compensating
some of those who have their TEAs taken in order to lower overall
only a fairly small number of firms." Id. (emphasis omitted). Such industrial groupings wield
"disproportionate power on questions of particular importance to themselves." Id. at 145. Across-
the-board TEA confiscations would certainly qualify as a "question of particular importance" to
the industry faced with them.
125. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 129-31 (2d ed. 1982);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
126. See Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick. A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation, in FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 205. 207 (Richard
L. Revesz ed., 1997) (arguing that because regulations do "not normally impose costs uniformly
across firms," market price might increase more than costs for some firms, resulting in intra-
industry transfers).
127. Firms in industries that produce a competing product-for example, solar energy
panels-might benefit from TEA cuts, however, and hence are likely to support such cuts.
128. Keep in mind that the purpose of the TEA confiscations at issue here is general emission
reduction and not punishment of particular industrial malfeasants.
129. Farber, supra note 112, at 280 ("Making the compensation requirement uniform...
protects unusually vulnerable groups that might otherwise suffer from violations of the general
custom of compensation.").
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emissions levels but not others would be analogous to compensating some
of those who have had their land taken to build a highway but not others.
Such a situation would understandably raise substantive due process and
equal protection concerns, and the government should be forced to explain
the reasons for the selectivity in the provision of compensation. An absolute
constitutional guarantee of compensation is too blunt an instrument to be
justified by what is likely to be a very rare occurrence and one sure to raise
eyebrows.
C. Commercial Fishers
Like their industrial-polluter counterparts, commercial fishers
regulated by TEA programs constitute a "concentrated minority" with
disproportionate political influence regarding matters that particularly affect
them. As David Dana observes, "For any given fishery, the number of
active commercial fishermen is likely to be relatively small, and each
individual fishing enterprise is likely to perceive its stakes in ... regulation
as enormous." 130 This provides them with low organization costs. Their
small numbers and geographic concentration make communication cheap
and allow for moral suasion to be brought to bear on free-riders. Since their
livelihood is at stake, it should not be too difficult to get fishers to come to
meetings. In addition, their geographic concentration is likely to make them
an important constituency for some local and state officials.13' Their usual
political adversaries, on the other hand, are likely to be a diffuse group
composed of consumers and ecologically minded citizens. Commercial
fishers might, however, occasionally come into conflict with recreational
and sports fishers, another relatively concentrated minority.132
That TEAs regulating commercial fishing are usually defined as
percentages of an overall TAC makes selective confiscations an even more
remote possibility than in the emissions context, thereby reinforcing
industry unity. 133 Tnis will not be the case, however, when portions of
individual operations' ITQs are confiscated and given to other operations,
especially to those already in the program.'3" For example, one fisher's ITQ
may be reduced from ten to five percent of the TAC and another's raised
130. David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons: Lessons Learned
from the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 835 (1997).
131. See id. at 836.
132. See id.
133. This is not to say that the burden of even proportionately apportioned cuts will fall
exactly evenly. Marginal fishing operations will feel the pinch more than more profitable ones and
might be forced to sell their ITQs and leave the industry.
134. If the confiscated portions are to go to those currently outside the program, such as
indigenous tribes, those already inside it are likely to be evenly affected and united in their
opposition. They would now be faced with another organized constituency, however.
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from ten to fifteen percent as a result. As mentioned earlier in the context of
fairness,135 in this limited circumstance, constitutional guarantees of
compensation might be appropriate.
D. Land Development
The one likely exception to the general political advantage held by
TEA-holders takes place in the context of TDR programs. Because of the
usually one-shot nature of TDR use, in contrast to the ongoing nature of
other TEAs that regulate activities such as fishing or manufacturing, TDR-
holders can become split into factions-those who have utilized their TDRs
and those who have not-that can come into conflict under certain
circumstances. Specifically, those who have already used their TDRs might
support a program that freezes or drastically reduces overall development,
which would be accomplished primarily by confiscating the TDRs of
owners of undeveloped land.' 6 Such owners of undeveloped land are
unlikely to enjoy organizational advantages relative to owners of already
developed land, particularly residential homeowners. Owners of developed
land are likely to be at least as cohesive an interest group as owners of
undeveloped land. The former are more likely to live near each other and to
have frequent interaction, both of which lower organizational costs. As
William Fischel describes it, the typical development scenario involves
"a large and well-organized group" of current residents facing one or
a few owners of undeveloped land, who represent the interests of
nonresident nonvoters and are often nonresidents themselves.'" Owners of
undeveloped land are unlikely to receive beneficial treatment in this
scenario. Even if a greater number of such owners probably would be
affected. by a general TDR cut than by typical zoning decisions and
regulations, they are still likely to be outnumbered by residential
homeowners. Where the TDR program governs mostly undeveloped rural
land, rather than urban or suburban, it obviously becomes less likely that
owners of undeveloped land will be outnumbered.
More generally, owners of undeveloped land are less likely to share
the organizational advantages of their occupationally organized TEA
counterparts. Owners of undeveloped land are much less likely to have
formed an organized interest group prior to the imposition of the TEA
135. See supra text accompanying note 60.
136. For current residents, the costs of new development in terms of greater demand for
public services, more crowding, less open space, and so forth. might outweigh the benefits.
Simply by restricting the supply of new housing, homeowners can raise the value of their own
homes. See FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 221-24.
137. ld. at 5. Fischel is particularly concerned with jurisdictions of about 100,000 people or
fewer. See id at 105.
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program and probably will not form one even after the imposition of the
program. Because they are not repeat players and are only a small part of
the polity, they are less able to engage effectively in interest-group politics.
Consequently, if they are singled out to bear losses, they are unlikely to be
able to obtain redress either through immediate compensation or through
logrolling. As Saul Levmore argues, "It is unlikely that such individuals
can compete effectively in the political arena .... [T]he transaction costs of
individual involvement in politics [are,] after all, quite great." '38
So even in the context of TDR programs that do not place them in
direct opposition to owners of developed land-for example, habitat and
wetland preservation programs-owners of undeveloped land might not
enjoy disproportionate political influence. However, this will by no means
always be the case. Although they do not enjoy the organizational
advantages of industrial firms and commercial fishers, large landowners-
especially if their parcels are geographically concentrated, which is likely
given the localistic nature of TDR programs-will often be organizationally
advantaged relative to those with only a diffuse ecological interest in the
land.
Owners of undeveloped land also will often have powerful real-estate
interests as allies in their fight against TDR confiscations, although perhaps
not in their battle to receive compensation when the cuts appear inevitable.
Construction firms, labor unions, real-estate brokers, financiers of real-
estate development, and other pro-development forces all have a stake
in fighting TDR confiscations. They also usually constitute standing,
occupationally organized interest groups. As such, and unlike the owners of
undeveloped land who actually hold the TDRs, they are organizationally
advantaged relative to residential homeowners.'39 This provides owners of
undeveloped land with a vicarious organizational advantage over anti-
development landowners in larger, more diverse, urban settings in which
interest-group politics are dominant. And as already mentioned, such
landowners might have the numerical advantage in some rural settings.
This leaves the suburban setting. While pro-development real-estate
interests also exist in suburbia, their organizational advantages are largely
neutralized. In this smaller and less complex political setting, residential
homeowners can more easily monitor land-use decisions that affect their
138. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 307 (1990).
Levmore is discussing those singled out to bear the brunt of regulation, in general, and owners
who have their land confiscated, in particular. His reasoning applies to all small groups who do
not constitute standing interest groups. The organizational start-up costs faced by political one-
shotters, such as TDR-holders who have had their TDRs confiscated, are often formidable.
139. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 345 (2d ed. 2000)
("[Pro-development forces] are likely to be better able to communicate their interests... to
politicians than are existing homeowners, who are a larger, more diffuse group of people ... 
(citations omitted)).
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interests and express their preferences to political decisionmakers who are
dependent on their votes.' 4 In other words, they face low organizational
costs. So given that residential homeowners usually constitute a substantial
majority of voters in suburban jurisdictions, 4 ' if their preferences unite in
favor of uncompensated TDR cuts, this will be the likely outcome,
regardless of the interest groups aligned against them. In sum, the public-
choice case in favor of constitutionally guaranteed compensation for TDR-
holders is strongest in the context of suburban politics.
IV. CONCLUSION
Confiscations of TEAs with respect to programs that regulate emissions
and extractions offer a paradigmatic example of a situation in which
concentrated minorities with high stakes and correspondingly low
organizational costs face-off against diffuse majorities with high
organizational costs. The regulatees in this case, industrial polluters and
commercial fishers, are already likely to enjoy disproportionate influence,
thereby making constitutional guarantees in their favor excessive. In the
land-development context, the situation is more complex. Although they
might have some interest-group allies, landowners themselves do not share
the organizational advantages of their TEA brethren. TDR confiscations can
place the owners of undeveloped land in opposition to residential
homeowners, who might have the political advantage, especially in
suburban contexts. In this circumstance, and since there are fewer reasons
to confiscate TDRs and stronger equity and efficiency considerations in the
land-development context, a case can be made for guaranteed compensation
in at least some TDR programs.
Constitutionally binding promises of compensation will not result in net
benefits and should be avoided, except when TEA-holders do not enjoy
considerable organizational advantages. Otherwise, given the bias likely
already to exist against altering programs in a manner adverse to the interest
of TEA-holders, guaranteed compensation is unlikely to improve on the
normal government practice of weighing the costs and benefits of courses
of action that affect the value of TEAs.
140. Suburban and small-town government fits William Fischel's "majoritarian." as opposed
to interest-group, model of politics: (1) The government knows the preferences of the majority;
(2) the voters are aware of the government's actions; and (3) the majority coalition is relatively
stable. See William A. Fschel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation
for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 115, 122 (1989); see also Elickson, Suburban Growth
Controls, supra note 56, at 405-07 (describing why small municipalities often conform to a
majoritarian model of politics).
141. See ELLIcKSON & BEEN, supra note 139, at 344.
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